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POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: BANKERS LIFE &
CASUALTY CO. v. CRENSHAW
I. INTRODUCTION
While for some time there has been academic comment that punitive
damages1 awards in civil cases might be subject to some constitutional
restrictions,2 and some cases have suggested the same in dicta,3 Bankers
Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw4 is the first case in which a majority of
the Supreme Court has indicated its willingness to consider what, if any,
constitutional standards might be applicable in awarding punitive dam-
ages.5 In Bankers Life, the Court refused on prudential grounds to reach
the punitive damages question but stated that if the punitive damages
issues had been more fully developed in the lower courts, the Supreme
1. This note uses "punitive damages" to refer to what are also called "exemplary," "retribu-
tory," "aggravated," or "vindictive" damages, or "smart money."
2. See, eg., C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES 275-76 (1935); Leitner,
Punitive Damages: A Constitutional Assessment, 38 FICC Q. 119 (1988); Jeffries, A Comment on the
Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139 (1986); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case
for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 (1983); Comment, The Constitu-
tionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH.
L. REv. 1699 (1987); Note, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. Cm. L.
REv. 408 (1967).
3. See, eg., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1003-08 (3d Cir. 1986) (dealing with
the possibility of multiple punitive damage awards in a mass tort case and its effect on class-action
certification); Womack v. Gettelfinger, 808 F.2d 446, 451-52 (6th Cir. 1986) (recognizing possible
constitutional issues in punitive damage awards, but deferring to state law); Wilmington v. J.I. Case
Co., 793 F.2d 909, 922 n.10 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting constitutional criticisms of punitive damages
and describing the question as "interesting and significant," but not addressing the issue because it
had not been raised by the parties); In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188 (8th Cir. 1982)
(Heaney, J., dissenting) (multiple punitive damage awards for the same action violate fundamental
fairness); Toepleman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697, 700 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 989
(1959) (suggesting that the excessive fines clause might apply to punitive damages in civil cases).
4. 108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988).
5. In a case very similar to Bankers Life, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986),
the appellant also challenged a large punitive damages award as violating the contracts clause, the
excessive fines clause, and the due process clause of the Constitution. Id. at 1589. Although the
majority of the Court stated (per Burger, CJ.) that these challenges "raise[d] important issues
which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved," the Court failed to reach the punitive damages
issues because it found that one of the state supreme court justices who participated in the decision
below should have been disqualified. Id. Also, in Aetna, unlike in Bankers Life, the Court gave no
indication of how it might decide a properly raised constitutional challenge of punitive damages. See
generally Comment, Squelching First Party Bad Faith Breach of an Insurance Contract: Aetna v.
Lavoie, An Opportunity Lost, 9 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 439, 447-52 (1986).
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Court would have been willing to address them.' Concurrences by Jus-
tices White, O'Connor, and Scalia also recognized that punitive damages
awards might raise constitutional questions.7 This apparent willingness
to consider constitutional challenges will probably keep the issue before
the Court.' There are many possible constitutional grounds on which
the Court might limit punitive damages, but if it does decide to limit
punitive damages, the preferable approach for the Court would be to es-
tablish some minimum procedural safeguards on punitive damages
awards, relying on the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Bankers Life arose out of a suit against an insurance company for
bad-faith refusal to honor a valid claim. The plaintiff, Lloyd M. Cren-
shaw, was repairing the alternator of his wife's car on January 6, 1979,
when the alternator rolled off of a workbench, striking Crenshaw's right
foot.9 Two days later Crenshaw was taken to a hospital emergency room
6. Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1651.
7. Id. at 1654-56.
8. During the 1988 Term, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to address an exces-
sive fines challenge to punitive damages in Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 845
F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 527 (1988), in which the Second Circuit held that
punitive damages of six million dollars were not unconstitutionally disproportionate to the actual
damages of $51,146. Id. at 410.
Even if the excessive fines question is settled in Kelco, the constitutionality of punitive damages
is likely to be an issue in subsequent cases. See White, New Cases, Familiar Issues, ATLA ADVOC.,
Nov. 1988, at 2 ("Some defendants, believing that the Court would welcome a[n] ... opportunity to
address the issue have embarked on a strategy of raising this constitutional argument in every case in
which punitive damages are at issue."). Cf Morris, Punitive Damages: Rising to the Supreme Court's
Challenge, 30 FOR THE DEFENSE, Aug. 1988, at 1, in which the president of the Defense Research
Institute writes that following Bankers Life,
[t]he challenge presented to the defense community is to watch for a case, at the trial level,
that could be the case in which the Court ultimately will come to grips with this issue.
Defendants and defense counsel faced with punitive damages claims ought to raise consti-
tutional issues in a timely fashion, brief those issues carefully, and preserve their constitu-
tional objections in the lower courts.
IaL The Defense Research Institute, which represents the insurance defense bar, favors the complete
abolition of punitive damages. See The Defense Research Institute, The Defense Research Institute's
Position on Punitive Damages, 27 FOR THE DEFENSE, Sept. 1985, at SR21.
This position has been vigorously opposed by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.
See, eg., Amincus Curiae Brief of Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct.
1645 (1988) (No. 85-1765); T. LAMBERT, THE CASE FOR PUNIVE DAMAGES: A NEW AUDIT
(ATLA Monograph Series 1988).
9. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 256 (Miss. 1985), aff'd, 108 S.
Ct. 1645 (1988).
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where he was examined, given analgesics, and told to keep his foot ele-
vated.1" When Crenshaw's foot continued to be painful and swollen, he
was admitted to the hospital on January 14.11 After further evaluation,
Crenshaw's physicians determined that amputation was necessary, and
Crenshaw's lower right leg was removed on January 18, 1979.12
Crenshaw filed a claim with Bankers Life on April 9, 1979 under a
medical insurance policy that allowed up to $20,000 in coverage. 13
Bankers Life, however, refused to honor Crenshaw's claim because in the
opinion of the Medical Director of Bankers Life, Dr. Nathaniel McPar-
land, Crenshaw's amputation was caused by a pre-existing arterioscle-
rotic deterioration of Crenshaw's foot." This denial of any causal
relationship between the injury to Crenshaw's foot and the amputation
was made despite Bankers Life's knowledge that its medical records for
Crenshaw constituted an incomplete basis for denying coverage.' 5
Crenshaw then brought suit against Bankers Life in Mississippi state
court, requesting $20,000 in actual damages and $400,000 in punitive
and exemplary damages for bad-faith refusal to honor his claim.' 6
Before trial, Crenshaw raised his punitive damages claim to $1,635,000.17
At trial, the jury decided that Banker's Life had known that Crenshaw's
injury should have been covered, and awarded $20,000 in actual and
$1,600,000 in punitive damages. 8
B. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Opinion
Bankers Life appealed the jury's decision to the Mississippi Supreme
Court, which affirmed the jury verdict without modification in an opin-
ion to which four of the nine justices dissented as to the reasonableness of
the amount of the punitive damages. 9 The majority held that because
10. Id. at 257-58.
11. Id. at 258.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 260.
14. Id. at 260-64.
15. Id. at 264.
16. Id. at 264-65.
17. Id. at 264.
18. Id. at 256.
19. Id. at 279, 282. For a good discussion of the Mississippi Supreme Court's opinion in the
context of Mississippi insurance law, see Comment, Insurance Bad Faith in Mississippi, 55 MISS. L.J.
485 (1985).
1989]
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Bankers Life had inadequately investigated Crenshaw's claim, and be-
cause its reason for refusing the claim was not a valid defense in Missis-
sippi, Bankers Life was liable for punitive damages.20 The majority also
upheld the amount of the punitive damages award as being within the
discretion of the jury.21 The court ruled that Mississippi law allowed a
punitive judgment award to be altered only when the amount showed
such "passion, bias and prejudice" as to shock "the judicial
conscience."
22
The dissenters in the Mississippi Supreme Court decision recognized
that Bankers Life's actions entitled Crenshaw to damages beyond simple
compensatory damages but disagreed with the majority as to the propri-
ety of a $1.6 million punitive damages award. One of the dissenters be-
lieved that while some amount in punitive damages was warranted, the
size of the jury's award "grossly exceed[ed] a sum necessary to constitute
some meaningful punishment to Bankers Life."2 The other dissenters
would not have allowed any punitive damages, but would have granted
costs and attorney's fees to Crenshaw on state law grounds.24
In its appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, the only constitu-
tional challenge that Bankers Life raised was the claim that unrestricted
punitive damages violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment by chilling the exercise of a litigant's right of access to the
courts.25 This claim was not decided in the Mississippi Supreme Court,
but in its petition to the Mississippi court for rehearing (which was de-
nied), Bankers Life argued that the punitive damage award "consti-
tute[d] an excessive fine, and violate[d] constitutional principles, '26 and
in its brief in support of its petition for rehearing, Bankers Life stated
that the award violated "due process, equal protection, and other consti-
tutional standards. ' 27 These very limited invocations of constitutional
20. Bankers Life, 438 So. 2d at 276. In justifying the decision, the court wrote:
[c]onduct of an insurance company not authorized by law which carries with it a potential-
ity of great harm to the insurance public is an outrage, and should be condemned. Punitive
damages in such a case is an appropriate, and perhaps the only remedy. In this kind of
case, it is the medicine most likely to cure the malady.
Id.
21. Id. at 278.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 282.
24. Id. at 301.
25. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct. 1645, 1649 n.1 (1988).
26. Id.
27. Id.
[Vol. 24:429
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issues ultimately led the United States Supreme Court to refuse on pru-
dential grounds to decide Bankers Life's constitutional claims.28
After holding that the jury's verdict against Bankers Life should be
affirmed without modification, the Mississippi Supreme Court assessed a
fifteen percent penalty against Bankers Life pursuant to a Mississippi
statute29  that penalizes unsuccessful appellants.30  This penalty
amounted to $243,000.31 Bankers Life filed a Motion to Correct Judg-
ment, asking the Mississippi Supreme Court to remove the penalty on the
ground that it violated the due process and equal protection guarantees
of the Mississippi and federal constitutions. 32 The motion was summa-
rily denied by the Mississippi Supreme Court.33
C. Issues
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Bankers Life raised
two issues: first, whether the punitive damage award against Bankers
Life violated either the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment,
the contract clause of article I, or the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment;34 and second, whether the Mississippi statute35 under which
the Mississippi Supreme Court assessed a fifteen percent penalty against
Bankers Life violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.36 The Supreme Court refused to rule on the pu-
nitive damages issue on the ground that it would be imprudent to decide
the question without fuller development of the issues at the state court
level, but indicated a willingness to consider the question when the ap-
propriate case arises." The Court did, however, rule that a fifteen per-
cent penalty on unsuccessful appeals does not violate the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.38
28. Id. at 1651.
29. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-3-23 (Supp. 1988).
30. Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1649.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-3-23 (Supp. 1988).
36. Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1651.
37. Id. The Court wrote that because the question might be addressed directly by the Missis-
sippi legislature and courts, by denying review, "any ultimate review of the question that we might
undertake will gain the benefit of a well-developed record and a reasoned opinion on the merits. We
think it unwise to foreclose these possibilities .... " Id. See supra note 8.
38. Id. at 1654.
19891
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III. LAW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES PRIOR TO BANKERS LIFE
A. Development of Punitive Damages in English Law
Although damages resembling punitive damages were available in
some ancient legal systems, 39 punitive or exemplary damages are a rela-
tively recent development in Anglo-American law,4" having first been
recognized in the 1763 English case, Huckle v. Money.41 In Huckle, the
plaintiff, who had been wrongly imprisoned under a general warrant,
brought suit against the agents of the British government who had ar-
rested him.42 On appeal, the court ruled that although Huckle only suf-
fered perhaps £20 in actual damages, it was within the jury's prerogative
to assess £300 in damages to punish the government for "exercising arbi-
trary power, violating Magna Charta, and attempting to destroy the lib-
erty of the kingdom., 4 3 The court held that it was also within the
discretion of the jury to award damages in excess of purely compensatory
damages to punish the defendants for a particularly outrageous act, and
also to deter similar acts in the future." In a related case, Wilkes v.
Wood,45 the appellate court also permitted punitive damages, apparently
accepting the plaintiff's rationale that compensatory damages alone
would not deter the kind of conduct in which the defendant had
engaged.46
Punitive damages, while still possible under English law, have re-
cently been drastically limited in common law tort actions by the case of
Rookes v. Barnard.47 Before Rookes, English law did not clearly distin-
guish between punitive damages (awarded as punishment and as a deter-
rent) and compensatory damages for such intangible harms as moral
outrage or emotional distress."a Rookes distinguished punitive from
39. See Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day
Society, 49 UMKC L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1980) (precursors of punitive damages in the Code of Hammu-
rabi, the Mosaic law, and Roman law).
40. 1 J. GHIARDI & I. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.01 (1985 &
Supp. 1988). But see Comment, supra note 2, at 1714 (punitive damages traced in the form of
amercements to before Magna Carta in 1215).
41. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 82 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (review of the development of punitive damages with an emphasis on defa-
mation cases); Belli, Punitive Damages: An Historical Perspective, 13 TRIAL 40 (Dec. 1977).
42. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
43. Id. at 769.
44. Id.
45. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763).
46. Id. at 490.
47. [1964] App. Cas. 1129.
48. See GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 40, § 1.03; K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES
§ 5.3(A), at 530 (1980).
[Vol. 24:429
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compensatory damages and limited punitive damages to cases involving
government oppression (as in Huckle and Wilkes) or situations in which
compensatory damages alone could not prevent unjust enrichment of the
defendant.49 Punitive damages are also available in England when pro-
vided for by statute."
B. The Development of Punitive Damages in the United States
American courts began awarding punitive damages at an early
date,51 and during the nineteenth century, the doctrine became recog-
nized in most states.52 Despite criticism of punitive damages by some
courts, 53 most jurisdictions came to recognize punitive damages in tort
cases involving malice, ill will, recklessness, or some other particularly
culpable state of mind of the defendant. 4 As they developed, punitive
damages were available in most tort cases not involving negligence,-5 or
occasionally in a contract case involving fraud or oppression. 6
C. The Modern American Law of Punitive Damages
In most states punitive damages are still available in tort cases in-
volving reckless, outrageous, or malicious conduct, although some state
courts have rejected the doctrine when no statutory authority provides
for it.57 While punitive damages are still most common in tort cases,
they have increasingly been extended to contract actions, 8 especially
those involving insurance contracts.5 9 Generally, punitive damages have
been awarded under insurance contracts either for the bad-faith refusal
49. Rookes, [1964] App. Cas. at 1226 (per Lord Devlin).
50. Id. at 1225.
51. The earliest American case referring to punitive damages appears to be Coryell v.
Colbaugh, 1 N.J. 90 (1791) (punitive damages in breach of promise to marry case given for deterrent
effect). See generally K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.3(B) (1980).
52. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 534, 536 (1851) (describing punitive damages as "a
well-established principle" of the common law).
53. See, eg., Riewe v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 264-65, 9 N.W. 88, 89-91 (1881); Fay v.
Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872).
54. W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 9-10 (5th ed. 1984); C. MCCOR-
MICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 79 (1935).
55. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 81 (1935).
56. See, eg., Hobbs v. Smith, 27 Okla. 830, 115 P. 347 (1911) (defendant sold hogs under
contract despite knowledge that hogs were infected with cholera).
57. See, eg., Moore v. Blanchard, 216 La. 253, 43 So. 2d 599 (1949); Wilfong v. Omaha &
Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co., 129 Neb. 600, 262 N.W. 537 (1935); Boott Mills v. Boston & M. R.R.,
218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914). For a current analysis of jurisdictions allowing punitive dam-
ages, see GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 40, at table 4.1.
58. See Note, Punitive Damages in Contract Actions: Are the Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?,
20 WASHBURN L.J. 86 (1980).
59. The leading case in this area is Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,
1989]
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to honor a valid claim (as in Bankers Life) or for the bad-faith refusal to
defend an insured against suit.6°
Federal law expressly provides for punitive damages in some cir-
cumstances and prohibits them in others. Congress has provided for civil
plaintiffs to recover punitive damages in certain suits in which criminal
enforcement alone might be inadequate to achieve the goals of the statute
or in which compensatory damages alone would be an insufficient deter-
rent to the defendant.61 Federal statutes also expressly prohibit punitive
damages in some situations where Congress has determined that such
awards would be undesirable as public policy.62 Finally, the Supreme
Court has held that "the federal courts have both the jurisdiction and the
authority to impose punitive sanctions in their efforts to devise a federal
law of remedies. 6
3
In recent years, punitive damage awards have become increasingly
controversial as they have grown in frequency and amount.6' The "tort
reform" movement in particular has attacked the concept of punitive
damages, and this has led to the passage of statutes limiting punitive
damages in several states.65 These well-publicized disputes and the large
amount of academic commentary in the area might well encourage the
89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970). See generally Kornblum, The Current State of Bad Faith and Punitive
Damage Litigation in the US., 23 TORT & INS. L.L 812 (1988).
60. See Annotation, Failure to Defend Insured, 20 A.L.R. 4th 23 (1983); Woodard, Punitive
Damages for Bad Faith Breach OfAn Insurance Contract: It's Unconstitutional, 54 OKLA. B.J. 1125
(1983); Koss, The Constitutionality Of Awarding Punitive Damages Against An Insurance Company
For Bad Faith: A Reply, 54 OKLA. B.J. 1999 (1983)..
61. K-g., 11 U.S.C. § 303(1)(2)(B) (1982) (punitive damages available for initiating an involun-
tary bankruptcy in bad faith); 15(2) U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) (treble damages available in antitrust suit);
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (treble damages available in racketeering suit); 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)
(1982) ($1,000 punitive damages to be awarded for certain violations of the Fair Housing Act). See
generally K. REDDEN, PUNMVE DAMAGES § 6.1 (1980 & Supp. 1987).
62. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1982) (foreign governments cannot be liable for punitive damages in
American courts); 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982) (United States cannot be liable for punitive damages
under Federal Tort Claims Act).
63. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 56 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
64. See M. PETERSON, S. SARMA & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FIND-
INGS v-ix (1987) (statistical study of punitive damages awards in Cook County, Ill., in San Francisco,
and in various other California locations); Belli, supra note 39, at 1-8. The study by Peterson,
Sarma, & Shanley of the Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice has, however, been criticized
by plaintiffs' lawyers as exaggerating the growth of punitive damages by studying areas of the coun-
try with an abnormally high level of punitive damage awards. See, e.g., Cox, Rand's Delicate Bal-
ance, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 1988, at 1, 36 (quoting criticism of the Institute for Civil Justice's
methodology by a former director of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America).
65. See, eg., COLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987) (limits punitive damages to an amount
equal to three times actual damages), FLA. STAT. § 768.73(l)(a) (Supp. 1988) (also limits punitive
damages to an amount equal to three times actual damages), and N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.16
(Supp. 1988) (prohibits punitive damages).
[Vol. 24:429
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Supreme Court to become involved, if only to settle for state and federal
lawmakers the constitutional limits of punitive damages.
D. Rationale for Punitive Damages
The awarding of punitive or exemplary damages in civil cases has
been defended on various grounds, but the primary reason given is to
punish especially reprehensible conduct that is not likely to be punished
and, hence, not deterred by the criminal law.66 Thus, in the case of an
insurance company that refuses in bad faith to honor a valid claim, puni-
tive damages might be justified as punishing and deterring such conduct,
which is unlikely to lead to criminal prosecution.67
Other courts have justified punitive damages as a means for plain-
tiffs who have been egregiously injured to recover for injuries that are
usually not compensable, such as moral outrage, wounded feelings, or
attorney's fees.68 This theory, however, has lost much of its rationale as
damages for mental pain and suffering have become generally available,
and is currently only subscribed to by the courts in three jurisdictions.6 9
E. Challenges to Punitive Damages
1. Theoretical Criticisms
Much criticism of punitive damages has been based on the idea that
the civil justice system should be limited to compensation and punish-
ment should be left to the criminal law.7" The New Hampshire Supreme
Court has gone so far as to state that allowing civil punishment by means
66. Punitive damages "are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by
civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 908 (1978) (punitive
damages are awarded to punish and to deter, not to compensate). See also GHIARDI & KIRCHER,
supra note 40, § 2.02.
67. See, e.g., Brief of Appellee at 37, Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct. 1645
(1988) (No. 85-1765). See also Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1982) (analyzing the rationales given for punitive damages and dividing them
into (1) punishment of the defendant, (2) deterring the defendant from recidivism, (3) deterring
others, (4) preserving the peace, (5) encouraging private enforcement of the laws, (6) compensating
for legally unrecognized harms, and (7) indirect payment of attorney's fees).
68. GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 40, § 2.10; KEETON, supra note 54, at 9.
69. Connecticut, Michigan, and New Hampshire (the New Hampshire court's rationale has
been rendered moot by statute, see infra, note 71). K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.3(A)
(1980).
70. See, eg., Schmidt, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages: A Challenge for the Judiciary,
27 FOR THE DEFENSE, Feb. 1985, at 20; DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AGAINST
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 8 (1969).
19891
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of punitive damages "is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an un-
sightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the
body of the law."71 Critics argue that to allow private plaintiffs to exact
punishments against civil defendants and to receive punitive damages
that are assessed for the general benefit of society is anomalous and philo-
sophically unsound.72
2. Constitutional Challenges
While the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the general constitu-
tional limits of punitive damages, it has established some limitations on
punitive damage awards in defamation cases. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., the Court ruled that punitive damages could be awarded in defa-
mation cases only if the defendant were found to be reckless or malicious
in publishing the defamatory material.74 The Court, apparently rejecting
the rationale for punitive damages that they compensate for intangible
losses, found that punitive damages "are not compensation for injury.
Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries."7 5 The Court found
some safeguards on punitive damage awards necessary because a jury's
great discretion in awarding punitive damages allows a jury selectively to
punish defendants who voice unpopular views.76 The Gertz holding still
limits punitive damages in defamation cases, but it has recently been nar-
rowed by the Court to apply only to those suits involving matters of
public interest.77
While the Gertz rule is only applicable to defamation cases (or per-
haps other cases in which punitive damages chill a fundamental right),
71. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872). This is the leading American case opposing puni-
tive damages. In a long and scholarly opinion, Justice Foster examined most of the prominent An-
glo-American cases dealing with punitive damages and discussed the philosophical basis for punitive
damages. Justice Foster argued that the civil law should only compensate for actual injury:
What is a civil remedy but reparation for a wrong inflicted, to the injury of the party
seeking redress,--compensation for damage sustained by the plaintiff? How could the idea
of punishment be deliberately and designedly installed as a doctrine of civil remedies? Is
not punishment out of place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional, unjust, unscientific, not to
say absurd and ridiculous, when classed among civil remedies? What kind of a civil rem-
edy for the plaintiff is the punishment of the defendant?
Id.
72. DEFENSE RESEARCH INsTITUTE, supra note 70, at 13.
73. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See generally Comment, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages in
LibelActions, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1382 (1977).
74. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50.
75. Id. at 350.
76. Id.
77. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985).
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the case is significant as the only time when the Supreme Court has ex-
pressly limited punitive damages on constitutional grounds. The Gertz
decision has been cited by the Court in the context of non-defamation
cases,78 and the approach taken in Gertz suggests that the Court is un-
likely to abolish punitive damages in all situations, but will simply limit
them so that they do not impinge on constitutionally protected values.
In other cases critics of the constitutionality of punitive damages
have argued that if punitive damages are combined with a criminal con-
viction, this constitutes double jeopardy in violation of the United States
Constitution79 or state constitutions. Almost all such challenges have
been rejected on the ground that the concept of double jeopardy applies
only to multiple criminal convictions for the same offense,8" and those
challenges that have been successful have relied on common law or state
constitutional grounds.8'
Punitive damage awards have also been criticized as allowing pun-
ishment without proof beyond a reasonable doubt,82 without protection
against self-incrimination,83 and as interfering with interstate com-
merce.8" These challenges have been rejected with little comment by the
courts.
IV. DECISION OF THE CASE
In Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,85 the justices joining in
the majority opinion and the justices in concurrence recognized that ex-
cessively large punitive damages may raise constitutional questions under
the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment, the contracts clause
of article I, or the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
However, because the defendant had not sufficiently developed its consti-
tutional arguments before the Mississippi Supreme Court, the majority
78. E.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979) (punitive dam-
ages denied on statutory grounds in breach of duty of fair representation suit against union).
79. U.S. CONsT. amend. V, cl. 2.
80. See, eg., Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1042 (5th Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Anderson, 42 Colo. App. 497, 499, 596 P.2d
413, 415 (1979). See generally Note, supra note 2, at 413-17.
81. See, eg., Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Wolfe, 128 Ind. 347, 27 N.E. 606 (1891) (dictum).
82. See DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTrrUTE, supra note 70, at 21; Note, supra note 2, at 417.
83. See Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 52, 25 P. 1072, 1074 (1891). See also
DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 70, at 21; Note, supra note 2, at 430.
84. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 49-50 (1987) (Mississippi punitive damage
award for bad faith failure to honor insurance claim does not regulate interstate commerce in an area
pre-empted by Congress); Daugherty v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 85 F.R.D. 693, 695 (N.D.
Ga. 1980).
85. 108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988).
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refused on prudential grounds to reach the punitive damages question
and held only that Mississippi's penalty on unsuccessful appeals did not
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 6
A. The Majority Opinion
In the majority opinion by Justice Marshall, the Court refused to
consider the constitutional challenges that Bankers Life had raised to the
punitive damages assessed against it by the Mississippi courts. The Court
found that Bankers Life had not directly presented the Mississippi
Supreme Court with the same constitutional arguments that it argued in
the Supreme Court, and for the Court to make a decision on such a
poorly developed record would be imprudent.8 7 The only remaining is-
sue for the Court to decide was the constitutionality of the Mississippi
statute imposing a fifteen percent penalty on unsuccessful appeals to the
Mississippi Supreme Court, and the Court held this statute was a permis-
sible means for Mississippi to discourage frivolous appeals.88
1. The Court's Jurisdiction over the Punitive Damage Claim
In its arguments before the Mississippi Supreme Court, Bankers Life
raised constitutional challenges to the punitive damages award against it
only in its petition for rehearing, and then only in a "vague appeal to
constitutional principles." 9 The Court noted that for a constitutional
question to be preserved on appeal to the Supreme Court, it must be
raised before the state courts, in this case the Mississippi Supreme
Court.90
The Court assumed, without deciding, that the failure of Bankers
Life to raise its constitutional challenges below did not create an absolute
bar to reviewing such questions under its certiorari jurisdiction.91 The
Court stated, however, that it would refrain for prudential reasons from
deciding such questions out of federalism concerns and the need for a
well-developed record on appeal. The Court found that such restraint
was particularly appropriate when the questions raised by appellants
such as Bankers Life were "of some moment and difficulty." 92 The
86. Id. at 1654.
87. Id. at 1651.
88. Id. at 1654.
89. Id. at 1650.
90. Id. at 1651 (citing Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 501 (1981)).
91. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
92. Id.
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Court also refrained from deciding Bankers Life's constitutional chal-
lenges to punitive damages because such a decision might "short-circuit"
the resolution of the issue by state legislatures or by state courts applying
state laws.93
2. The Mississippi Penalty Statute
The Court did address Bankers Life's challenge to the Mississippi
statute94 providing for a fifteen percent penalty for unsuccessful appeals
to the Mississippi Supreme Court, and held that the statute did not un-
constitutionally burden an appellant's access to the courts.95 The Court
found that Mississippi had a legitimate interest in discouraging frivolous
appeals and conserving judicial resources, and that this interest was not
outweighed by any discouragement the statute might give to would-be
appellants with meritorious claims. 96 The Court held that the statute
thus did not violate equal protection and the Court affirmed the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court's assessment of a $243,000 penalty on Bankers
Life's appeal.97
B. Justice White's Concurrence
Justices White and Scalia concurred with the majority's decision in
Bankers Life, but disagreed on the grounds for refusing to consider the
punitive damages question. The two justices agreed that the punitive
damage question should not be considered by the Court, but rejected Jus-
tice Marshall's prudential grounds for refusing to decide the matter.98
The justices argued that the Court had no jurisdiction over the question
because it had not been raised below, and the Court was thus absolutely
barred from reaching a decision on the merits. 99 They concurred, how-
ever, with the majority's rationale for upholding the Mississippi penalty
statute. 100
C. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Like Justices White and Scalia, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
93. Id. For some such legislative developments, see W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAWv OF TORTS 1-9 (5th ed. Supp. 1988).
94. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-3-23 (1988).
95. Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1653-54.
96. Id. at 1653.
97. Id. at 1654.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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majority's upholding of the Mississippi penalty statute, but disagreed
with the majority on the grounds on which the punitive damages ques-
tion was dismissed. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, agreed
that Bankers Life had failed to sustain an excessive fines or contract
clause challenge to its punitive damages award, but believed that it had
raised valid due process claims before the Mississippi Supreme Court.1"'
Justice O'Connor did not believe, however, that a decision on the due
process claim should be made in the Bankers Life case, because Bankers
Life had addressed most of its arguments to its excessive fines challenge
of punitive damages without developing the due process issue.a0 2
Most significantly, however, Justice O'Connor appeared to be recep-
tive to the view that punitive damages may well violate the due process
clause by assessing civil fines without any objective standard to limit their
amount. 10 3 She wrote that the Supreme Court "should scrutinize care-
fully the procedures under which punitive damages are awarded in civil
lawsuits,"'" because the "wholly standardless discretion [of a jury] to
determine the severity of punishment appears inconsistent with due
process."' 10 5
D. Justice Blackmun's Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Blackmun concurred with the majority on the punitive dam-
ages issue. He was the only justice to dissent, however, on the penalty
question. 10' 6 In balancing the interests involved in the equal protection
question, Justice Blackmun found that the penalty placed too great a
burden on appellants and was inconsistent with the Court's
precedents. 107
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Implications of Bankers Life
Bankers Life is the first case in which a justice of the Supreme Court
has indicated that punitive damages might violate some provision of the
Constitution other than the first amendment. In her concurrence, Justice
O'Connor appears to have accepted many of the due process arguments
101. Id. at 1655.
102. Id. at 1656.
103. Id. at 1655.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1656.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1658 (citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)).
[Vol. 24:429
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss3/4
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
that have been made against punitive damages for over a century. °8 The
majority of the Court in Bankers Life also indicated that it believed
Bankers Life's constitutional challenges to punitive damages were of
"some moment and difficulty."' 0 9 From these dicta in Bankers Life, one
can surmise that the seven justices involved in the decision believe that
colorable constitutional challenges to punitive damages might be
presented, but that more development will be necessary at the lower
court level before it will be appropriate for the Supreme Court to come to
any decisions.
Other recent cases also indicate that the Court may be willing to
address constitutional limits on punitive damages. In International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust,"10 the Court, with Justice
Marshall writing for the majority, refused to allow punitive damages
against a union for failure to represent its members fairly."' Justice
Marshall characterized punitive damages as an "extraordinary sanction"
and refused to permit them where Congress had not specifically author-
ized them by statute." 2
In a similar case brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Justice
Marshall, again writing for the majority, permitted punitive damages to
be awarded, but only because he found that Congress had intended to
authorize them.' 13 In an elaborate dissent joined by Justice O'Connor,
Justice Rehnquist recited many of the "cogent and persuasive criticisms
that have been offered of punitive damages generally."'" 4 Justice Rehn-
quist wrote that punitive damages are "in sharp contrast" to the "funda-
mental premise of our legal system ... that damages are awarded to
compensate the victim-to redress the injuries that he or she actually has
suffered."" 5 Justice Rehnquist also seems to have accepted the view that
punitive damages are "a windfall to plaintiffs" that should be paid to the
state, and that "punitive damages are frequently based upon the caprice
and prejudice of jurors."6
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia are,
108. See generally GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 40, § 3.03.
109. Bankers Life, 108 S. Ct. at 1651.
110. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
111. Id. at 52.
112. Id. at 48.
113. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
114. Id. at 57.
115. Id. at 57-58 (emphasis in original).
116. Id. at 59.
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therefore, at least sympathetic to some of the arguments made by oppo-
nents of the present system of punitive damages as it exists in most states.
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun have already refused to per-
mit punitive damages in first amendment cases such as Gertz" 7 and in
other cases such as Foust,118 and the fact that they joined the majority in
Bankers Life implies that they at least recognize that a colorable consti-
tutional argument might be made against punitive damages, although it
does not indicate how they might decide the issue when the appropriate
case arises.
Further uncertainty about the Supreme Court's resolution of the
constitutionality of punitive damages comes from the fact that neither
Justice Stevens nor Justice Kennedy participated in the decision of Bank-
ers Life. Justice Kennedy had not yet been nominated to the Court when
the arguments in the case were heard on November 30, 1987. Justice
Kennedy does not appear to have decided any constitutional challenges
to punitive damages while on the Court of Appeals, and so there is not as
yet any indication of his views on the matter." 9 Similarly, there is no
indication of how Justice Stevens might decide a constitutional challenge
to punitive damages, leaving very uncertain the way in which the
Supreme Court might respond to an appropriately brought challenge to
punitive damages.
B. A Suggested Approach to the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages
The most serious need in the current law of punitive damages is for
an approach that recognizes that punitive damages may serve a valuable
purpose in deterring behavior that criminal or compensatory civil penal-
ties cannot reach,1 21 while at the same time providing sufficient safe-
guards to prevent the quasi-criminal punishment of civil defendants in
117. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
118. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
119. In the most significant punitive damages case in which he participated while on the Court
of Appeals, In re Pais Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980), Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that a California statute prohibiting punitive damages in
wrongful death actions did not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and Califor-
nia Constitutions. Id. at 1323-24. Perhaps significantly, however, then-Judge Kennedy wrote that
"[fjudicial restructuring of a matter as complex as the incidence and effects of punitive damages
would be especially prone to unforeseeable error." Id. at 1319 n.5.
120. See Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 79, 99-101 (1982)
(a sophisticated legal and economic analysis of the deterrent effect of punitive damages); Levine,
Demonstrating and Preserving the Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages in Insurance Bad Faith Ac-
tions, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 613, 638 (1979) (defending the award of punitive damages to prevent "ftjhe
marked lack of social or moral concern which has too frequently characterized insurance claims
practices.").
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violation of fundamental principles of fairness. A procedural due process
approach to this problem would avoid many of the problems with the
excessive fines challenges to punitive damages, and would comport with
the approach that a growing number of state legislatures and supreme
courts have taken.
1. Problems With Challenges of Punitive Damages on
Excessive Fines Grounds
The excessive fines arguments raised by defendants in cases like
Bankers Life are unlikely to be accepted by the Supreme Court for sev-
eral reasons. Most importantly, a rule of substantive law limiting puni-
tive damages to a certain multiple of actual damages would be redundant
of the common law practice of remittitur. The law is well established
that an appellate court may reduce a jury award of damages or order a
new trial if the verdict shows passion or prejudice,' 21 or if the amount of
punitive damages awarded has no "reasonable relation" to the plaintiff's
actual damages or otherwise shocks the conscience of the court.' 22 Sec-
ondly, establishing a fixed ratio of punitive to actual damages would
come very close to judicial legislation by the Supreme Court, and would
present the Court with a serious problem of finding some judicially dis-
cernible standards for prescribing a fixed ratio.'23 Without a fixed ratio,
courts would have difficulty determining when punitive damages became
excessive, and such a vague standard could have little practical value.
Finally, the Court has suggested that the eighth amendment applies only
in criminal cases, 2a and it might be reluctant to open an entirely new
121. See, eg., Minneapolis, St.P. & S.S.M. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521 (1931); Harmsen v.
Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 882 (1983).
122. See, eg., Jenkins v. Arab Termite & Pest Control of Florida, Inc., 422 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98, 101 (Utah 1985). See also M.
PETERSON, S. SARMA & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (1987), in
which the authors calculate that "most large punitive damage awards were reduced by post-trial
activity, and only half of the money originally awarded by juries in the sampled cases eventually
ended up in the plaintiffs' hands." Id. at 30.
123. This concern was raised by Justice Scalia during oral argument of Bankers Life. See L.A.
Daily J., Dec. 1, 1987, at 1, col. 2. But see Comment, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment:
An Analytical Framework for Determining Excessiveness, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1433 (1987), in which
the author argues for a constitutionally mandated flexible ratio between actual and punitive
damages.
124. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) ("An examination of the history of the
Amendment and the decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those convicted of crimes."). Ingraham might,
however, be read narrowly to apply only to the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the eighth
amendment. There is also strong historical support for the idea that the excessive fines clause was
intended by the drafters of the Bill of Rights to apply to civil cases. See Massey, The Excessive Fines
Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1987).
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category of challenges to verdicts in civil suits.
2. A Suggested Due Process Approach to Punitive Damages
A preferable approach to setting constitutional limits on punitive
damages would be to set procedural due process restrictions on the
award of punitive damages. 121 This would involve raising the standard
of proof for punitive damages to a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard, and as a partial consequence, bifurcating a trial involving punitive
damages.
Raising the standard of proof for punitive damages awards to a clear
and convincing evidence standard would prevent the fundamental unfair-
ness of stigmatizing a defendant simply on the basis of a preponderance
of the evidence. A punitive damage award generally requires a jury to
find malice, bad faith, recklessness, or some other culpable and morally
reprehensible state of mind. 126 In addition to the monetary loss suffered
by a punitive damages defendant, the injury and stigma of such a finding
might cause serious harm to a defendant's good name and honor, espe-
cially in professions such as medicine that require a large degree of trust.
These monetary and reputational losses clearly involve a deprivation
of the "liberty" and "property" of the defendant, which triggers the
Mathews v. Eldridge1 27 due process test. This test determines whether a
person's due process rights have been violated by examining the private
interest and the government interest involved and the risk that an errone-
ous deprivation might occur. It is clear that raising the standard of proof
would help insure the accuracy of punitive damage awards and promote
both the private and governmental interests in fair and accurate verdicts.
Such a standard might well reduce the frequency with which plaintiffs
receive punitive damages, but this is a very limited interest, because it
only makes a windfall to a plaintiff less likely without affecting the plain-
tiff's ability to be compensated for actual injury. A clear and convincing
125. These arguments have been made by a number of commentators. For a particularly cogent
and detailed argument in favor of such procedural safeguards, see Wheeler, The Constitutional Case
for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 (1983). See also Beckman, Consti-
tutional Issues in Insurance Claim Litigation, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 244, 254-57 (1987).
126. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
127. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews test balances:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.
Id. at 335.
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evidence standard might affect the government's interest in deterring
anti-social behavior, but it is unlikely that the deterrent effect of punitive
damages would be so reduced as to encourage a significantly higher level
of the behavior sought to be discouraged.
The soundness of raising the standard of proof in punitive damages
cases is demonstrated by its increasing adoption by state courts and legis-
latures. Three state supreme courts have recently raised the standard of
proof in punitive damages cases to "clear and convincing," '128 as have
legislatures in several states.1 29 This appears to reflect a growing consen-
sus that the serious and stigmatizing nature of punitive damages requires
that punitive damages be assessed only against those who are clearly, and
not merely probably, liable.
As a consequence of raising the standard of proof in punitive dam-
ages cases, it would also be necessary to bifurcate trials in which punitive
damages are claimed.130 It would be very difficult, as a practical matter,
128. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 300 n.23, 294 N.W.2d 437, 458 n.23
(1980). See also Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 723 P.2d 675 (1986), in
which Justice Cameron wrote that
[a]s this remedy is only to be awarded in the most egregious of cases, where there is repre-
hensible conduct combined with an evil mind over and above that required for commission
of a tort, we believe it is appropriate to impose a more stringent standard of proof. When
punitive damages are loosely assessed, they become onerous not only to defendants but the
public as a whole. Additionally, its deterrent impact is lessened. Therefore, while a plain-
tiff may collect compensatory damages upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence of
his injuries due to the tort of another, we conclude that recovery of punitive damages
should be awardable only upon clear and convincing evidence of the defendant's evil mind.
Id. at 332, 723 P.2d at 681 (citation omitted). See also Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina, 486
N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ind. 1986); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1363 (Me. 1985) ("[A]Ithough
punitive damages serve an important function in our legal system, they can be onerous when loosely
assessed. The potential consequences of a punitive damages claim warrant a requirement that the
plaintiff present proof greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence."). Cf Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974), in which the Supreme Court required a heightened standard
of proof in defamation cases.
129. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (Supp. 1988) (clear and convincing evidence required for
punitive damages except in wrongful death actions); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Supp. 1988); FLA.
STAT. § 768.78(1)(b) (Supp. 1988) (clear and convincing evidence required for punitive damages
more than three times compensatory damages); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (Supp. 1988); IND.
CODE § 34-4-34-2 (1986); MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1988); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (Supp. 1988) (clear
and convincing evidence required for punitive damages to exceed compensatory damages). See also
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1987) (adopting a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard).
130. Such bifurcation has been required by statute in some states. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1(d) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 58 C-5 (1987) (in products liability actions). It
has also been recognized as proper in some court decisions. See, eg., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus.,
Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Freels, 583 F.2d 337, 343 (7th Cir. 1978) (It is
within the trial court's discretion to bifurcate.). Contra United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d
302, 306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961) (bifurcation held to be improper when liability
and damages are closely related). See also Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 277, 294
N.W.2d 437, 447 (1980) (failure to bifurcate may prejudice the defendant).
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for jurors to assess liability for compensatory damages under one stan-
dard while at the same time assessing liability for punitive damages
under another. Furthermore, bifurcating trials would prevent the preju-
dice now caused to defendants in punitive damages trials by presenting
the jury with evidence of the defendant's wealth in order for them to
determine an amount of damages necessary to have an appropriate deter-
rent effect." '3 A bifurcated trial would allow evidence of the defendant's
wealth only after liability and the proper amount of compensatory dam-
ages had been determined. 32
VI. CONCLUSION
The only issue that Bankers Life settles definitively is the constitu-
tionality of a fifteen percent penalty on unsuccessful appeals in a state
court system. Those justices joining in the majority opinion and those in
concurrence all seem to recognize in dicta, however, that some punitive
damages awards may raise serious constitutional questions. If an appro-
priate case arises in the next few years, the Supreme Court may be will-
ing to decide when, if ever, punitive damages may violate the United
States Constitution. How a majority of the Court might decide such a
case is unclear, but the preferable approach would be to establish some
procedural protections under the due process clause to prevent defend-
ants from being subjected to the stigma and possibly crushing financial
burden of punitive damages without adequate safeguards.
Joseph .M. Woltz
131. See Note, Punitive Damages and the Admissibility of Evidence of Wealth, 29 ALA. L. REV.
564 (1978); Note, Evidence of Defendant's Financial Condition Is Admissible to Determine the
Amount of Punitive Damages to be Awarded Against the Defendant, 27 DRAKE L. REv. 584 (1977)
(dealing largely with Iowa cases).
132. See, ag., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d) (Supp. 1988).
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